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Item 7 of the Provisional Agenda 
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT IN CEIJTRAL AMERICA 
Resolution F/CN .]2/143 of the Second Sessi~n of ECLA. requested 
the Secretariat in collaboration Hith FAO to organize a joint study 
group for the purpose of carrying out investigations into agricultural 
credit and submitting reports to the Third Session of ECLA. Because 
of the limited resources available, it VIas decided to confine the 
study for the first year to the republics of Central ~~erica. The 
following paragraphs contain a sw~ ary and conclusions of the study 
while detailed evidence is given in Annexes I to IV. 
Until 1929 the export of coffee and bananas maintained the 
prosperity of tHe Central iJ'Ilerican republics; when prices and profits 
were high there was considerable net investment in these countries and, 
furthermore, foreign capital was attracted. However, little attention 
at that time 1N'as paid te ether branches (If agriculture or t. the 
development of industry. 
The economic crisis which start ed in 1929 revealed the essential 
weakness of these economies vlhich depended primarily on the export of 




commodities collapsed l there ensued not only a banking crisis but 
equally a social crisis. The existing banking systems proved inadequate 
to <l eal with t he economic dislocation 'tlhich fac ed these countries. 
Neither was there governmental machinery for alleviating the material 
sufferings of the populntion. 
This situation brought about eJ. fundamental change in public 
opinion e.nd in the policy of the Central Iunc rican governments. There 
was 2 general desire to broaden the basis of the economy of each 
country and to depend l ess exclusively on the one or two staple export 
products. This first led to a r eform of the banking system and secondly 
t o the promotion of industry, of hitherto negl(:;cted branches of farming 
and, in this l att er connection, to the development of agricultural 
credit institutions. Hortgage credit as a means of strengthening the 
land t enure system and farm improvement credit as a means of stimulating 
agricultural production be came matters for discussion and later for 
action. J\ soundly administered credit syst em could acc el er at e the 
proc ess of capital f orme.tion and incr68 s 8 nroduction in agriculture. 
However, production 0 f c raps for the home market, particularly of 
foodstuffs, was then and still is in t he hands of sm1'.ll scale ~roduc e rs, 
indeed, to 2. l arge ext ent I in the hands of subsistence;; f a.r mers having 
little or no r el ationshi p l.rith thG mr:!.rket economy. The problem wp..s a 
twofold one ~ of developing on the one hand a sound financi al 
administration of f "'.rm credit, and on the oth8r hAnd of making the 
small f armers economic 8.1ly strong enough to become borrowers of money. 
The last t \-lenty years, 19JO-50, have been a period of experimentation 
in these fi elds. 
/The gener al pattern 
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The genera1 patt.ern wa:5 the creation of a Central Benk under 
~vernment control and an agency for the administration of farm 
credit, either as a part of the Bank er separotely_ 
In Costa Rica, when the law of the National Bank of Costa Riea 
We.S promulgated in 1936, speeial provisions were made for the creation 
of a mortgage department within the bank end for the creation within 
the commercial department of a Section of Rural Credit Boards (Juntas 
Rur<:'.lcs de Cr~dito Agr:!co1a). 
In El Sn1.vador, the Mortgage B~mk was founded 'in 1935 and in 
1939 stC'rted farm credit operations. In 1943 the "Federaci6n de Cajas 
de Credito Rural" was founded. 
In Gu~temala, the National i~rtgage Bank (Credito Hipot ecario 
Nacional) was found ed on 4 December 1929. 1\ specicl. department was 
created ~~thin this institution in 1945 c~ed the Department of 
Cooperative Development (Departumento de Fomento CODperativo) with 
the purpose of establishing cooperative organizations to foster 
agricultural production. Subsequently the "Instituto de Fomento de 
1a Producci6n" was created and orgcmiz8d e. Department of Agricultural 
and Industrial Credit (Departl':IJnento de Credito Agropecu.<1.rio e Industrial'. 
In Nicaragua, the 1940 law of the "Banco de Nicar!l.gua" provided 
for the establishment of PJ1 p.griculturC'l credit section. Previously, 
in 1930 the Mortge.ge BClnk of Nicaragu £l. (BC'J1cO de Credito Hipot ecario 
de Nicaragua) N2 S founded. 
In the cours e of 1949 the Hondura s government r equested the help 
of the International Nonct 1'_ry Fund to establish not only a Central 
Bank but also an i.gricultural Developmcmt Benk. Both the s e be.nks p..re 
.. ," Ino"'! in the 
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now in the process of formation. 
In each case these banking and farm credit institutions were 
created on the initiative of governments, not by any impulse Of the 
existing conunercial banks or from the farming communities. The purpose 
of tho governments was to help the small farmers And to foster 
agricultural development. For example, the Farm Credit Act of 
El Salvador states that lIit is in the interest of the national economy 
that small farmers should have bette r purchasing power" and that "this 
can be brought about most effectively by measures which bring the 
benefits of credit lArithin their reach". 
Although the laws with respect to farm credit which were 
promulgated during this period were t echnically sound, the fact remains 
that the systems established have in nearly all of the countries faced 
gr9.ve financial cris es or have collapsed. Noreover, they have failed 
not during and because of a period of economic depression, but actually 
during a period of comparative prosperity. Furthermore, according to 
the views of the governments themselves reported to the ~Qssion, the 
fundamental reasons for the failure of agricultural credit are the 
same in each and! all. These reasons are: 1) lack of administrative 
org~nization; 2) insufficient financial strength of borrowers; 
3) insufficient funds of the credit institutions; 4) inadequate system 
of appraisal of property; and 5) unwise proliferation of activities. 
1) The principal faults of administrative organization have been: 
a) lack of t echnically trldn8d personnel, and b) a tendency toward 
excessive dec entralization of lO2.n activitics ,...rhich has proved 
/ particuh.rly unfortunate 
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particularly unfortunate in the a.bsence of adequate personnel and of 
effective control from the centre. 
2) Most small farmers were and are not credit-~rthy either beeause 
there is no adequate marketing organizati~n to take care or the surpluses 
which they produce or because they farm on a subsistence basis and have 
not as yet sufficient surpluses available for sale whieh would justify 
them in incurring financial obligations. Before a farm credit system 
ean operate successfully, steps must be taken to improve marketing 
taeilities, especially by providing stable and remunerative prices to 
producers, likewise through expanded extension services to increase 
the marketable surpluses of the small farmers. 
3) Sums of money earmarked by the gevernments or the Central 
Banks for the purpose of farm credit were in many cases so small that 
they were shortly exhausted~ As a result farmers soon lost confidence 
in the agricultural credit institutions. There wor e cases when the 
farmers did not repay their loans simpJ.y because they knew that there 
were no further prospects of borrowing from these institutions. 
4) In many eases insufficient attention was given to the appraisal 
cf the properties and other collateral offered hy borrowers, and 
appraisals of property wer e frequently based upon the commercial value 
of the land rather than on its income-yielding value. Unneeessarily 
sharp fluctuRtions in the prices of products for the internal market 
have further complicated the problem of evaluation. 
5) Finally, cert ain farm credit agencies, in the hope of making 




series or other business enterprises whieh had little to do with farm 
credit. In many cases, not only have these enterprises oc~upied much 
of the time of the ste.ff which might have been dcV{)ted to activities 
in the field of credit, but also the opera.tions have resulted in a loss 
instead of an increase of funds. 
These shortcomings are l ess marked in some countries than in 
others. Some countries, such as Costa Rica, which have an environment 
more f avourable to the operation of farm credit, h~ve recorded 
significtillt success during the last dec r..de. Others have recently 
experienced or arc still experiencing a crisis. fllOr eover t the difficulties 
are inter-rel at ed. It is bec~use credit institutions have been given 
insuffici ent funds that they are t empt ed to undertnke extrtilleous 
business activities. It is because technically trained staff are not 
available that decentralization will not work. It is bec ~use of this 
lack of st aff and of the primitive character of marketing facilities 
that valuations are likely tv be erroneous. 
It is further of importance to observe that, although there is so 
much similarity between the difficulties experienced in each of these 
countries, ther e is little knowledge in anyone countr,y of the problems 
faced by the athers. Indeed it is quite r emarke.ble hO\'l little 
interchange of experience ther e has be en in this field despite the 
great similarity of the credit programmes. 
The following principal conclusions present themselves for the 
consideration of the governments: 
1) Steps should be taken to train personnel in the fi eld of fRrm 
credit administration. To a large extent this can be done within the 
Icountries 
- ---- -- ------ .--------~~------
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countries themselves by establishing special courses in the subject 
or by devoting more attention to farm credit in schools or universities. 
However, hrrving regard to the size of the countries, results in most 
cases would not be commensurate with the costs. Another way of 
improving the t echnical competence of the administrators would be 
for each country to send a select few to other countries in order to 
lcc.rn the methods that have proved ~uccessful there. In countries 
where f a rm credit has been successfully adapt ed to the existing 
C'_gricultUr2.1 system, students CM do a great de<'..l by studying the 
methods 8ffiployed, ?~d they c~ carry what they have learned back to 
countries the.t h?v8 not yet r eached the seme stp.ge of development. 
2) Gcve::rnmunts, through their b".nking inst:i .>_~tions, may wish to 
conside r the des':rabL. i.ty of making large r SUJnt; avaiL,ble fnr 
agricultural cre~it, especially where the credit syst um is already 
soundly brsed. Central hmeric .3. is at pr?sent experiencing a considerable 
degree of prosperity en account of the fe.vour!1ble prices of certein 
eXDort products, e.nd it might be advisable to channel a part ·J f the 
current gains into agricultural credit adwinistrations that can 
effectively use a larger supply of funds. 
3) At the SD...'ll e time steps must be taken t o de-leloy the '';l'edit­
worthiness of small sce.1e producers. It is just as important to 
strengthen the demand f or credit as to augment the supply. Strengthening 
the demand means; J.S ::,tt..'.ted J.bove, giving to the farmer the capacity 
to incre8,se the c;uant·~·;·,.,. of l""'')duc c for 8 0:.18 a:1Q e.t th,~ same time 
improving marketing facilitics . In the case of countries "trhich helve 
/ C:.. l arge part 
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a large part of their population virtually outside the market eeonomy J 





4) Finally, there remains much to be done in establishing uniform 

proeedures in credit administration. This would include clear 

definitions of the different types of credit ~~de available to farmers, 

st?.ndard procedures for the filing of applications and stendard methods 
for the colleetion and publication of statistics. Through such reforms 
a given country will not only have better means of judging the current 
financial strength of its own credit system, but will be able to make 
useful comparisons with the systems of neighbouring countries. 
In order that these four points may be examined further by experts, 
it is suggested thC'.t the Executive Secret ary of ECLA and the Director 
General ~f FAO be authorized forthwith to cC'~l,in Central America, a 
meeting of agricultural credit experts ~ would consider the suggestions 
made in this r eport and make recomr1cndations to the r espective 
governments for practicAl action in this field. 
